Abstract. Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close interconnections are shown to hold between the di®erent constructions.
K ±® is consistent (strong consistency) [10] . We will also have use for some other properties related to consistency: If K is consistent, then K ±® is consistent (consistency preservation) [15] . If both K and ® are consistent, then so is K ±® (weak consistency preservation) [13] . If K * K ±®, then K [ (K ±®)`? (consistent expansion) [3] . Consistent expansion follows from vacuity and relative success. Subexpansion is a fairly plausible property for conventional (prioritized) belief revision, but it is much less so for non-prioritized revision. This can be seen from examples such that¯6 2K , :¯6 2K , ®6 2K ±®, and ®^¯6 2K ±(®^¯). (For instance, let ® denote that there is a living dinosaur in Australia and¯that there is a living tree in Australia of a species that existed at the time of the dinosaurs.) Such a pattern cannot simultaneously satisfy subexpansion, relative success, and closure. (From ®6 2K ±® and relative success follows K ±® = K . Since :¯6 2K we then have :¯6 2K ±®, and due to closure, K ±® 0 :¯, so that by subexpansion¯2 K ±(®^¯). Since¯6 2K it follows from relative success that ®^¯2 K ±(®^¯), contrary to the conditions.) This problem can be avoided if we replace subexpansion by the following variant, that is equivalent with subexpansion whenever success holds.
If ® 2 K ±® and K ±® 0 :¯, then (K ±®)+¯µ K ±(®^¯) (guarded subexpansion).
x3. Constructions. In this section, we are going to introduce¯ve constructions of non-prioritized revision on belief sets. The¯rst of these is the most general one. Its basic assumption is simply that some inputs are accepted, whereas others are not. Those that are accepted form the set C of credible sentences. This will be called credibility-limited revision since the acceptance of inputs is limited to sentences with su±cient credibility. Definition 1. Let K be a logically closed set of sentences. The operation ± on K is a credibility-limited revision on K if and only if there is an AGM revision ¤ on K (satisfying the six basic postulates) and a set C of sentences such that for all sentences ®:
The following are some plausible conditions on C.
If`® $¯and ® 2 C, then¯2 C (closure under logical equivalence). If ® 2 C then Cn(f®g) µ C (single sentence closure) Section 1.
The generalization of single sentence closure to full logical closure (Cn(C) µ C) is patently unreasonable; each of ® and¯may be credible without ®^¯being so. (For an obvious example, let¯= :®.)
Our second construction is a modi¯ed version of David Makinson's screened revision [15] . Makinson made use of a set A of potential core beliefs that are immune to revision. The belief set K should be revised by the input sentence ® if ® is consistent with the set A \ K of actual core beliefs, otherwise not. In our version, we have replaced A \ K by a set A of core beliefs. For expository convenience we will present this construction as a special case of De¯nition 1, with the set A of core beliefs as the determinant of whether or not a sentence ® is a member of the set C of credible sentences.
Definition 2. Let ± be a credibility-limited revision operator for K , based on ¤ and C. Then it is 1. an operator of core beliefs revision if and only if there is a set A µ L such that ® 2 C i® A 0 :®. 2. operator of consistent core beliefs revision if and only if there is a consistent set A µ L such that ® 2 C i® A 0 :®. 3. an operator of endorsed core beliefs revision if and only if there is a set
If K is consistent, then all endorsed core beliefs revisions are also consistent core beliefs revisions.
Our third construction is a modi¯cation of epistemic entrenchment. In the standard account of entrenchment, due to Peter GÄ ardenfors [5, 6] , revision is based on a relation · that corresponds to usefulness in inquiry or deliberation, or to the amount of epistemic value. Definition 3. [5, 6] A standard entrenchment ordering for a belief set K is a relation · on L that satis¯es:
(EE4) If the belief set K is consistent, then ®6 2K if and only if ® ·¯for all¯(minimality).
(EE5) If¯· ® for all¯, then`® (maximality).
< is the strict and´the symmetric part of ·. A sentence ® is maximally entrenched according to · if and only if ± · ® for all sentences ±.
Entrenchment-based revision is usually de¯ned via entrenchment-based contraction [5, 6] . However, it is also possible to obtain revision directly from entrenchment, as follows [14, 18] :
(· ¤1)¯2 K ¤ G ® if and only if either (® ! :¯) < (® !¯) or`:®. Given the standard properties of the entrenchment relation, this is equivalent with:
(· ¤2)¯2 K ¤ G ® if and only if either (® ! :¯) < (® !¯) or :® is maximally entrenched. To construct non-prioritized entrenchment-based revision, we can make use of EE1-EE4 but give up EE5 (maximality). Furthermore, we can use the following variant of (· ¤2). The added condition¯2 K is needed to assure that (strong) consistency is given priority over success.
Our fourth construction makes use of the one-to-one correspondence that persists between propositions (sets of possible worlds) and belief sets. In a propositional approach, operations of belief change are performed on the set kK k of possible worlds. Indeed, the standard AGM revision operator (partial meet revision) of K by a corresponds to the selection of a subset of k®k that is non-empty if k®k is non-empty and equal to kK k \ k®k if kK k \ k®k is non-empty [8, 12] . We propose to distinguish between credible and incredible worlds, and to require that the latter never be included in an outcome proposition. Again, it is convenient to introduce the new construction as a special case of credibility-limited revision.
Definition 5. Let ± be a credibility-limited revision operator for the belief set K , based on C. Then ± is 1. an operator of credible worlds revision if and only if there is a set W C of possible worlds such that: ® 2 C if and only if there is some w 2 W C such that ® 2 w. 2. an operator of non-empty credible worlds revision if and only if this holds for a set W C 6 = ; of possible worlds. 3. an operator of endorsed credible worlds revision if and only if this holds for a set W C such that kK k µ W C .
If K is consistent, then all endorsed credible worlds revisions are non-empty credible worlds revisions. Two plausible additional conditions should be mentioned that relate W C to the outcome of the operation:
kK ±®k \ W C 6 = ; (outcome credibility). kK ±®k µ W C (strong outcome credibility). Our¯fth and last model is a variant of the previous one. Grove's sphere-based operations make use of the simple intuition that the outcome of revising kK k by k®k consists of those elements of k®k that are as close as possible to kK k. For that purpose, kK k can be thought of as surrounded by a system of concentric spheres [8] . Each sphere represents a degree of closeness or similarity to kK k. The outcome of revising kK k by k®k should be the intersection of k®k with the narrowest sphere around kK k that has a non-empty intersection with k®k. The equivalence of this construction with the full set of (basic and supplementary) GÄ ardenfors postulates is a fundamental result in AGM theory [5] .
Our modi¯cation consists in relaxing the standard requirements on sphere systems, so that not all possible worlds are elements of any sphere.
Definition 6. S is a system of spheres around Th(\S) if and only if it satis¯es:
(S1) ; 6 = S µ P(L ? ?),
, then S ® 2 S and S ® \ k®k 6 = ;, where S ® = \fG 2 S : G \ k®k 6 = ;g.
For any set A of sentences and sentence ®, A ? ® is the set of maximal consistent subsets of A not implying ®. Intuitively, S ® is the smallest sphere that contains some ®-world.
Definition 7. Let S be a system of spheres around K . The operator ± is a non-prioritized sphere-based revision operator for S if and only if it satis¯es:
x4. Representation theorems. This section reports a series of representation results through which the postulates of Section 2 and the constructions of Section 3 are closely knit together. Theorem 8 provides the starting-point, characterizing essentially those credibility-limited revisions that are available within an extensional framework. Theorem 10 exhibits some one-to-one correspondences between additional revision postulates and additional properties of the set C of credible sentences. Theorems 11-13 provide us with a series of axiomatically characterized constructions of increasing strength. The major results of this section are summarized in Figure 1 .
Theorem 8. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an operation on K . Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
1. ± satis¯es closure, relative success, inclusion, weak consistency preservation, consistent expansion, and extensionality. 2. There is an AGM revision operator ¤ for K and a set C µ L that is closed under logical equivalence, and such that ± is the credibility-limited revision induced by ¤ and C. 3. There is an AGM revision operator ¤ for K and a set C µ L that satises K µ C and is closed under logical equivalence, and such that ± is the credibility-limited revision induced by ¤ and C.
Proof. (2)-to-(1):
It follows directly from the construction that closure, relative success, inclusion, weak consistency preservation, and extensionality are satis¯ed. For consistent expansion, let K * K ±®. Then K ±® = K ¤® and ® 2 C. It follows from the vacuity and success postulates satis¯ed by ¤ that ¤ satis¯es consistent expansion.
(1)-to-(3): Let ¤ be the operation such that
Furthermore, let C = f® : ® 2 K ±®g. We need to show: (A1) that C is closed under logical equivalence, (A2) that K µ C, (B) that ¤ is an AGM revision operator, and (C) that ± is induced by ¤ and C. Part A1: To show that C is closed under logical equivalence, let ® 2 C and let`® $¯. Then ® 2 K ±®. It follows from ±-closure that¯2 K ±® and from ±-extensionality that K ±® = K ±¯. Then¯2 K ±¯, hence¯2 C.
Part A2: Let ® 2 K . It follows from relative success that ® 2 K ±®, hence ® 2 C. Observation 9. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set of sentences and ¤ an AGM revision on K . Let C 1 and C 2 be two sets of sentences. Let ± 1 be the credibility-limited revision based on C 1 and ¤, and ± 2 that based on C 2 and ¤. Then:
If
The proof of this observation is left to the reader.
Theorem 10. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an operation on K . Then the following pairs of conditions are equivalent:
1. ± satis¯es closure, relative success, inclusion, weak consistency preservation, consistent expansion, extensionality and
There is an AGM revision operator ¤ for K and a set C µ L that is closed under logical equivalence and satis¯es
(e) If K 0 ®, then :® 2 C (expansive credibility). and such that ± is the credibility-limited revision induced by ¤ and C.
The proofs of the various parts of Theorem 10 follow directly by adding the respective condition to the construction introduced in the proof of Theorem 8.
Theorem 11. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an operation on K . Then the following four conditions are equivalent:
1. ± satis¯es closure, relative success, inclusion, strong consistency, consistent expansion, extensionality, strict improvement, and disjunctive distribution. 2. There is an AGM revision operator ¤ for K and a set C µ L that is closed under logical equivalence, and satis¯es single sentence closure, disjunctive completeness and element consistency, and such that ± is the credibilitylimited revision induced by ¤ and C. 3. It is a core beliefs revision.
It is a credible worlds revision.
The postulates listed in Theorem 11 will be referred to as the core postulates. (Weak consistency preservation could be redundantly added to the core postulates, since it follows from strong consistency.)
Proof of Theorem 11.
(1)-to-(2) and (2)-to-(1): Directly from Theorems 8 and 10.
(2)-to-(3): Let the three conditions hold. Let A = f® : :®6 2Cg. Then ® 2 C i® :®6 2A. In order to prove that ® 2 C i® A 0 :® it is su±cient to show that A = Cn(A). By element consistency, ?6 2C, so that > 2 A and hence A 6 = ;. Let ® 2 Cn(A). We assume compactness. Since A is non-empty, there arē 1 ; : : : ;¯n 2 A such that f¯1; : : : ;¯ng`®. We need to show that ® 2 A.
It follows from¯1; : : : ;¯n 2 A that :¯1; : : : ; :¯n6 2C. It follows from repeated use of disjunctive completeness that :¯1 _ : : : _ :¯n6 2C.
Suppose that :® 2 C. Then, since :®`:¯1 _ : : : _ :¯n, single sentence closure yields :¯1 _ : : : _ :¯n 2 C, contrary to what was just shown. We may conclude that :®6 2C, hence ® 2 A. This¯nishes the proof.
(3)-to(2):
We need to show that all core beliefs revisions satisfy the three postulates. Let the operator be one of core beliefs revision, i.e., let there be some A such that ® 2 C i® A 0 :®.
To show that single sentence closure is satis¯ed, let ® 2 C and`® !¯. Then ® 2 C yields A 0 :®, and`® !¯yields`:¯! :®. Hence A 0 :¯, so that 2 C. To show that disjunctive completeness is satis¯ed, let ® _¯2 C. It follows from the de¯nition of core beliefs revisions that A 0 :(®_¯), hence A 0 :®^:¯, hence either A 0 :® or A 0 :¯. In the former case, ® 2 C, in the latter¯2 C.
To show that element consistency is satis¯ed, let ®`?. Then A`:®, hence ®6 2C.
(3)-to-(4): Let the operator be a core beliefs revision. Let W C = kAk. We then have ® 2 C i® A 0 :®, i® there is some w 2 W C such that w 0 :®, i® there is some w 2 W C such that ® 2 w.
(4)-to-(3): Let the operator be a credible worlds revision. Let A = Th(W C ). Then ® 2 C i® there is some w 2 W C such that ® 2 w, i® there is some w 2 W C such that w 0 :®, i® Th(W C ) 0 :®, i® A 0 :®. ¤ Corollary 1. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an operation on K . Then the following four conditions are equivalent:
1. ± satis¯es the core postulates and disjunctive success. 2. There is an AGM revision operator ¤ for K and a set C µ L that is closed under logical equivalence, and satis¯es single sentence closure, disjunctive completeness, element consistency and negation completeness, and such that ± is the credibility-limited revision induced by ¤ and C. 3. It is a consistent core beliefs revision. 4. It is a non-empty credible worlds revision.
Corollary 2. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an operation on K . Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
1. ± satis¯es the core postulates and vacuity.
2. There is an AGM revision operator ¤ for K and a set C µ L that is closed under logical equivalence, and satis¯es single sentence closure, disjunctive completeness, element consistency, and expansive credibility, and such that ± is the credibility-limited revision induced by ¤ and C. 3. It is an endorsed core beliefs revision. 4. It is an endorsed credible worlds revision.
It should be noted that disjunctive success follows from vacuity.
Theorem 12. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an endorsed credible worlds revision on K . Then:
1. ± satis¯es regularity if and only if it ± is an endorsed credible worlds revision satisfying outcome credibility. 2. ± satis¯es strong regularity if and only if it is an endorsed core beliefs revision that satis¯es strong outcome credibility. Proof. Part 1, from the postulate to the construction: We will use the same construction as in Theorem 8, but with the further speci¯cation that ¤ 0 (the revision operator for residual cases) is de¯ned so that K ¤ 0 ® = Cn(f®g) if ® 2 K . (It can easily be checked that this is an AGM operator.) It remains to be shown that outcome credibility holds, i.e., that kK ±®k \ W C 6 = ;. We can prove that K ±® µ C by assuming¯6 2C and showing¯6 2K ±®. Let¯6 2C. Then, K ±¯= K . It follows from K µ C that¯6 2K , hence¯6 2K ±¯, and by regularity¯6 2K ±®. It follows that K ±® µ C, and thus kK ±®k \ W C 6 = ;. Part 1, from the construction to the postulate: It follows from the construction that for all ®, if ® 2 C, then K ±® µ C. Let¯2 K ±®. There are two cases:
Case 1, ®6 2C. Then K ±® = K and¯2 K . Since this is an endorsed core beliefs revision, it is also an endorsed credible worlds revision (see Corollary 2 of Theorem 11), i.e., kK k µ W C . Since K is consistent, it follows that kK k\ W C 6 = ;, and since kK k µ k¯k it follows from this that k¯k \ W C 6 = ; or equivalentlȳ 2 C, from which follows¯2 K ±¯.
Part 2, from the postulate to the construction: Let strong regularity be satised. We can, without loss of generality, assume that ± is an endorsed credible worlds revision based on a set W C of credible worlds such that W C = kTh(W C )k. (To see this, not that there is a w such that ® 2 w 2 W C i® there is a w such that ® 2 w 2 kTh(W C )k.)
Let¯2 Th(W C ). Then kTh(W C )k µ k¯k, consequently W C µ k¯k, from which it follows that W C \ k:¯k = ;. It follows from the de¯nition of W C , :¯6 2K ±:¯. Applying strong regularity to this we obtain¯2 K ±®. Hence we have proved that Th(W C ) µ K ±®. From this follows kK ±®k µ W C .
Part 2, from the construction to the postulate: Let :¯6 2K ±®. From :¯6 2K ±® follows kK ±®k * k:¯k, and then from strong outcome credibility (kK ±®k µ W C ) that W C * k:¯k, hence W C \ k¯k 6 = ;, equivalently¯2 C, from which follows 2 K ±¯. ¤
Results from Theorems 11 and 12 are diagrammatically summarized in Figure  2 . In endorsed credible worlds revision, the set of credible worlds is a superset of the set kK k of worlds compatible with the belief set. If k®k intersects with kK k, then the outcome of revision is equal to the belief set corresponding to kK k \ k®k, see (1) in the¯gure. If k®k does not intersect with W C , as in (3), then the outcome is kK k. In the intermediate case, when k®k intersects with W C but not with kK k, the outcome may be a proposition that either (2a) consists only of credible worlds, (2b) consists in part of credible and in part of incredible worlds, or (2c) consists only of incredible worlds. A good case can be made that (2c), and perhaps also (2b), should be excluded. Regularity corresponds exactly to the exclusion of case (2c) and strong regularity to the exclusion of both cases (2b) and case (2c).
Theorem 13. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and ± an operator on K . Then the following three conditions are equivalent:
1. ± satis¯es the core postulates and vacuity, strong regularity, and disjunctive factoring. 2. ± is an entrenchment-based non-prioritized revision in the sense of De¯ni-tion 4, based on an entrenchment relation · on K that satis¯es properties EE1-EE4. 3. ± is a sphere-based revision operator around K in the sense of De¯nitions 6-7.
The following lemmas are needed for the proof of the theorem. The proofs of the lemmas are left to the reader. Lemma 14. Let · be a relation on L that satis¯es transitivity, dominance and conjunctiveness. Then:
only if :(® _¯) < (® _¯) ! ±. Since neither :®^:¯nor :¯is maximal, it follows from the de¯nition of ± that for all ±, ± 2 K ±(® _¯) i® ± 2 K ±¯.
Case 3, ® 2 K ±® and¯2 K ±¯: Using the symmetry of this case, we have two subcases.
Case 3a, :® < :¯: For one direction, let ± 2 K ±®. Then, since :® is not maximal, according to the de¯nition of ± we have :® < ® ! ±. It also follows from :® < :¯, by part 5 of Lemma 14 that :®´:®^:¯. Since dominance yields :¯·¯! ±, we can use transitivity to obtain both :®^:¯<¯! ± and :®^:¯< ® ! ±. Conjunctiveness yields :®^:¯< (® ! ±)^(¯! ±), hence by intersubstitutivity :®^:¯< (® _¯! ±), hence ± 2 K ±(® _¯).
For the other direction, let ± 2 K ±(® _¯). It follows from :® < :¯that :®^:¯´:®, hence :®^:¯is not maximal, hence it follows from ± 2 K ±(® _¯) that :®^:¯< ® _¯! ±. By dominance, ® _¯! ± · ® ! ±. Transitivity yields :® < ® ! ±, hence ± 2 K ±®.
Case 3b, :®´:¯. Then :®´:¯´:®^:¯. For one direction, let ± 2 K ±® \ K ±¯. Then :® < ® ! ± and :¯<¯! ±. Then by dominance and transitivity :®^:¯< ® ! ± and :®^:¯<¯! ±. Conjunctiveness and dominance yield :®^:¯< ® _¯! ±. Hence ± 2 K ±(® _¯).
For the other direction, let ± 2 K ±(® _¯). Then we have :®^:¯< ®_¯! ±. We already know that :¯´:®^:¯, and dominance yields ® _¯! ± ·¯! ±. Using transitivity to combine this, we obtain :¯<¯! ±, hence ± 2 K ±¯.
(2)-to-(3) From entrenchment to spheres: Let · be a relation on L that satis¯es EE1-EE4 with respect to the consistent belief set K . Furthermore, let S · be the set such that X 2 S · i® it satis¯es the following four conditions:
Let S ® = \fG 2 S · : G \ k®k 6 = ;g, and let Th(\S · ) = K . We need to prove that S · is a sphere system around K , i.e., that it satis¯es S1-S5, and that the revision operator based on it, for all inputs, yields the same outcome as the entrenchment-based revision operator based on · in the manner of De¯nition 4.
(Note in what follows that kf± : ® · ±gk = \fk±k : ® · ±g.)
In order to show S4,¯rst show that: If ? < ®, then kf± : ® · ±gk 2 S · . Given S4, S1 and S5 follow directly. The proof of S3 is also straightforward. The same applies to S2 if we¯rst use Lemma 18 to prove that for any nonempty subset D of S · , it holds that \D 2 S · . Given S2, we can prove that Th(\S · ) = K . It remains to prove revision-equivalence. For that purpose, let ± · be the credibility-limited revision operator based on · in the manner of De¯nition 4, i.e.,
Let ± S · be the operator based on S · in the manner for De¯nition 7, i.e., let
We need to show that for all ®, K ± · ® = K ± S · ®. This can be done with the help of the following two intermediate results:
-to-(2) From Spheres to entrenchment: Given the sphere system S around K , we de¯ne the following entrenchment relation for K :
® ·¯i® it holds for all S 2 S that if S µ k®k then S µ k¯k.
It is easy to verify that · satis¯es EE1-EE4. It remains to show that the entrenchment-based operator ± · that it gives rise to is identical with the spherebased operator ± S that is based on S.
For one direction of that proof, let¯2 K ± S ®. We have two cases. First case, [S * k:®k. Then¯2 Th(S ® \ k®k), hence S ® \ k®k µ k¯k, so that S ® µ k:® _¯k. By de¯nition, S ® * k:®k.
It follows from EE2 (dominance) that :® · :® _¯. From S ® µ k:® _¯k and S ® * k:®k follows that :® _¯· :® does not hold, hence :® < :® _¯. It follows from the de¯nition of ± · that¯2 K ± · ®.
Second case, [S µ k:®k. Then K ± S ® = K by the de¯nition of ± S , hencē 2 K . Next, let S be any sphere such that S µ k>k. Then S µ [S µ k:®k. Hence > · :®.
For the other direction, let¯2 K ± · ®. According to the de¯nition of ± · there are two cases.
First case, :® < ® !¯. Rewriting this condition, using the de¯nition above of ·, it holds (a) that for all G 2 S, if G µ k:®k then G µ k:® _¯k, and (b) that there is some G 0 2 S such that G 0 µ k:® _¯k and G 0 * k:®k. It follows from G 0 * k:®k that G 0 \ k®k 6 = ;, so that S ® µ G 0 . Hence S ® µ k:® _¯k = k:®k [ k¯k, hence S ® \ k®k µ k¯k, from which follows that 2 Th(S ® \ k®k). We also know from G 0 * k:®k that G 0 \ k®k 6 = ;, hence ([S) \ k®k 6 = ;. It follows from this and¯2 T h(S ® \ k®k) that¯2 K ± S ®.
Second case, > · :® and¯2 K . Let G 2 S. Then it follows from > · :® and the de¯nition of · that if G µ k>k then G µ k:®k. Since G µ k>k is true for all G 2 S, it follows that G µ k:®k for all G 2 S, hence [S µ k:®k, so that ([S) \ k®k = ;.
It follows by EE4 (minimality) from¯2 K , i.e., (by part 8 of Lemma 14) ? <¯, by the de¯nition of ·, that there is some G 2 S such that G µ k¯k. Hence \S µ k¯k, so that¯2 Th(\S) = K . It follows from this and ([S) \ k®k = ; that¯2 K ± S ®. ¤ 
